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In a well-known experiment, participants were asked to choose between 
two hypothetical worlds (Solnick & Hemenway, 1998). In world A, they earn 
$50,000 per year, while the other habitants of the world make $25,000. In 
world B, they earn $100,000, and the others receive $200,000. More than half 
of the respondents picked world A. Similar experiments gave similar results in 
different countries (Carlsson, Gupta, & Johansson-Stenman, 2009; Powdthavee, 
2009; Solnick, Hong, & Hemenway, 2007), demonstrating that individuals care about their rank in the income distribution, i.e., their relative income (Duesen-
berry, 1949).Furthermore, this experiment and others suggest that individuals are led by positional concerns, i.e., their position in the distribution of money, goods, 
positions, honours and status (Frank, 1999, pp. 162–165). In various contexts, 
individuals are motivated by their relative situation – their positional con-cerns – rather than by their absolute one, which challenges the view, articu-lated by neoclassical economics, of agents who only pay attention to their 
absolute situation when evaluating their well-being (Mason, 1998). The ra-tional choice for individuals, according to mainstream economics, would be 
to choose B over A, i.e., an income of $100,000 instead of $50,000, since they 
would then be absolutely better off. However, experiments like “the two 
worlds” indicate that individuals prefer an absolutely worse situation for eve-ryone if they are relatively better off.The two worlds experiment and other studies in psychology, sociology and economics show that individuals care about their relative standing (i.e., their 
standing relative to others) in the distribution of income, goods, positions, sta-tus and other symbolic rewards. Of course, not all the dimensions that are po-
tentially positional nurture relative concerns of the same intensity (Solnick & 
Hemenway, 2005). Nevertheless, individuals express positional concerns: they evaluate a state of affairs in regard to their own position in relation to the posi-tion of other relevant individuals.34 They care about their rank, about the ben-
34 The view followed in this paper shares similarities with the negative interdependent preferences 
view, which stipulates that individual preferences do not only include independent preferences 
(i.e., self-concerned or egoistic), but also interdependent ones (i.e., one’s satisfaction depends 
on  the  satisfaction of other  individuals)  (Pollak,  1976; Sobel,  2005; Zizzo,  2003).  ‘An economic 
agent has interdependent preferences when her utility depends not only on her payoff but also 
on that of other agents. This interdependence can be positive (say, because of altruism or group 
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authors (Frank, 1999; Heath & Potter, 2004), I argue that positionality as posi-
tional concerns is harmful for people (as a group as well as individually), and this is precisely the reason why institutions should regulate it.This article is thus a critical review of the main arguments to justify that institutions should respond to positional concerns through regulation. These 
arguments are sorted into four categories. (1) An initial case for regulation may be built by assimilating positional concerns to envy and, then, proving that 
envy is morally bad. Regulation is justified as long as institutions are demon-
strated to have a responsibility to curtail any form of morally wrong action. (2) 
A second option is to demonstrate that positional concerns are bad for subjec-
tive well-being (or happiness) and regulation is based on the role of institu-
tions in promoting subjective well-being. (3) A third possibility is to identify 
a threat to efficiency in positionality. The state can then legitimately inter-vene insofar as it is recognized as having a role in maximizing the allocation 
of productive resources. (4) The last set of arguments justifies regulation by the impact of positional concerns as dynamics and the result of such dynam-
ics (status) on individual material conditions. In short, it relies on reasons of equality and justice.The argumentative strategy retained in these pages relies on the wide-spread intuition that the badness of positional concerns lies in the fact that 
they express envious inclinations (1) or impair individual satisfaction (2) as a 
starting point. After having criticized these accounts as offering a weak, if not 
indeterminate, ground for regulation, the article spells out the efficiency argu-ment, which underlines the costs of positionality as well as its structure as a 
collective action problem (3). Finally, it is shown that the efficiency perspec-tive leads to taking into account the impact of positionality on people’s mate-
rial conditions and equality (4). To that respect, this article is original in that, 
in addition to presenting the first exhaustive normative analysis of the differ-ent grounds for regulating positional concerns, it claims that the strongest case 
possible is rooted in a combination of these last two dimensions (3 and 4).
In conclusion, the justifications for regulating positional concerns are one 
thing; but concrete institutional arrangements are another. The normative en-quiry carried out in this article opens the door for future discussions on the best way to regulate positionality from both an empirical point of view (what 
are the most efficient arrangements?) and a normative point of view (which 
ones are the most justifiable?). This article should then be interpreted as a pre-liminary step toward a full theorization of the regulation of positional con-cerns.
efits it gives to them, but also about its intrinsic value (Frank, 2007, p. 70). The evaluative judgments regarding individual achievements are then said to be 
context-sensitive (Frank, 2007, pp. 33–48).Such experiments show that individuals are eager to act upon such con-
cerns (Torgler, Schmidt, & Frey, 2008). For instance, individuals are eager to 
pay to reduce other people’s welfare in experimental settings (Zizzo & Os-
wald, 2001) or to pay significant amounts of money to gain status (Burkett, 
2006), which implies lowering the relative standing of others. When acting, individuals consider not only their absolute situation, but also their relative position and, then, the effects that different courses of action have on their rel-ative standing. Put differently, positional concerns are both evaluative and mo-
tivational. They are regularly presented as such in the literature on positional 
competition, relative standing, status-seeking and so forth. Moreover, this is the basis on which institutional regulation is advocated by, for instance, such a 
prominent figure as Robert Frank (Frank, 1999, 2007).
In accordance with this widespread view, this article focuses on ‘positional 
concerns’ (or ‘concerns for relative standing’), and the term of ‘positionality’ is used in this precise sense. Consequently, positional concerns refer to the very fact that individuals consider their rank, position or status when they evalu-ate their situation and, moreover, act upon such evaluation. Positional con-cerns are context-sensitive: they are evaluative assessments of one’s situation 
and achievements that depend on a specific social context. As such, they in-corporate a strong comparative dimension with individuals as the evaluator judges relevant for comparative purposes either because they belong to the im-
mediate environment (e.g., relatives, co-workers, friends) or to the evaluative framework (e.g., celebrities, people who belong to an envied socioeconomic 
category).This article takes positional concerns seriously by accepting the aforemen-tioned empirical results in order to formulate a normative evaluation of the role 
of institutions regarding positional concerns.35 Through a critical review of the existing arguments in favour of regulation, some reasons are demonstrated to be superior to others. The idea advanced is that the most solid reasons have 
less to do with mental states than with inefficient uses of resources and the 
impact on individual conditions. Elaborating on an idea introduced by other 
identification) or negative (say, because of envy)’ (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001, p. 40). This conceptual 
proximity provides an opportunity to develop a normative analysis that covers most of the lit-
erature on the topic.
35 Ronald Wender and Lawrence Goulder make a comparable distinction when they state that the 
ethical dimension of positionality is a somewhat independent concern (Wender & Goulder, 2008, 
p. 1980).
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An Intrinsic EvilThe moral condemnation of envy as being bad in itself is attractive because it matches moral intuitions that are commonly shared. Parents teach their 
children not to envy because it is bad, period (Hunt, 1997, p. 239). As Aristo-tle expresses it in the Nicomachean Ethics, ‘not every action nor every passion 
admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy…for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names 
that they are themselves bad…’ (1107a 11). In the same vein, the Decalogue pro-
hibits ‘coveting’ others’ property (Exodus 2:17).The argument that derives the badness of positional concerns from the in-trinsic evilness of envy is articulated around a moral baseline and a political 
conclusion. The moral part is to affirm that (a) positionality is an expression 
of envy, (b) envy is bad, and thus (c) positionality is bad (Hunt, 1997, p. 238). 
Then comes the political part: (d) since institutions have a prima facie obliga-
tion to regulate bad behaviours or intentions, (e) they face the obligation to 
regulate envy. Even if we accept the (controversial) premise (a), there are rea-sons for remaining sceptical about the complete argument for the very reason that something might be inherently bad, wrong, or whatever, without implying for institutions a prima facie duty to intervene, which undermines (d) and (e).
An argument stipulating that X is bad in all situations because it is inher-
ently so and, then, that this badness justifies regulation faces two challenges. 
Firstly, X could be inherently bad without implying any obligation for institu-
tions (e.g., in cases of lying, cheating on your spouse, etc.). The absence of an obligation to intervene lies in the discontinuity between personal and public commitments. The division between the private and public spheres expresses this discontinuity. For instance, most of us have the intuition that cheating or 
lying is objectionable most, if not all, of the time. But this judgment is differ-ent than the normative requirement for institutions to hunt down all forms of cheating and lying.
Secondly, X could be “not that bad” all the time. Some of its consequences might not be so, or it may be conducive to outcomes that are less detrimental 
than an alternative Y. Consequently, X’s intrinsic badness may not be sufficient, 
as X may not be bad all things considered. For instance, envy might incentiv-
ize people to work harder which is ultimately beneficial for society because 
it raises aggregate output (Buchholz, 2011). Applied to positional concerns, 
the intrinsic badness argument is insufficient to justify regulation. To do so, it should be proved that, beyond representing a bad, positional concerns also produce consequences that, ceteris paribus, remain negative. In other words, the case for regulation should be based on a critical evaluation of the conse-
ENVY
Positional concerns are commonly ascribed to or identified with envy (Grol-
leau, Mzoughi, & Sutan, 2006; Kolm, 1995; Matt, 2003), the latter motivating the former.36 But, more than a causal explanation, the badness of positional con-cerns is, according to this set of arguments, precisely that: to be led by some-
thing that is (or looks like) envy, prompting intuitive negative judgments.37
Envy (livor) is a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, 
even though it does not detract from one’s own… Yet envy is only an indirect 
malevolent disposition, namely a reluctance to see our own well-being over-
shadowed by another’s because the standard we use to see how well off we 
are is not the intrinsic worth of our own well-being but how it compares with 
that of others. (Kant, 1996, II §36)People envy others in a broad array of dimensions: achievements, endow-
ments, social recognition, spouse attractiveness, etc. (Elster, 1985, p. 50).38 This set of arguments has it that envy is the driving force behind relative concerns 
(Solnick & Hemenway, 1998, p. 374), and it explains why individuals prefer a world where they are relatively better off while everyone is absolutely worse off. This explains why, during lab experiments, people are prone to pay to re-
duce other participants’ welfare (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Positional concerns are the interpersonal manifestation of the emotion of envy.The statement that positional concerns are expressions of envy may be 
true or false. But, the problem does not lie therein. Even if proof is produced that envy explains positional concerns on empirical grounds, supplementary reasons are needed for why envy is bad on moral ones in order to legitimize regulating positionality. Three characteristics of envy may serve this purpose: 
(1.1) envy is inherently bad; (1.2) envy corrupts moral character; and (1.3) in-asmuch as envy compels people to adopt antisocial behaviour, it compromises 
some of the benefits that a well-functioning society should produce. This last version shifts the focal point from the inherent badness of positional concerns to its consequences, introducing the forthcoming sections.
36  If not strictly attached to positional concerns, envy  is  identified with more general social com-
parisons (Celse, 2010).
37 On the abusive assimilation of envy to its negative consequences, read Tai, Narayanan and Mc-
Allister (2012).
38 Helmut Schoeck provides a historical overview of the concept of envy in philosophy (Shoeck, 
1966, pp. 160–192).
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terms of the distribution of resources, opportunities or discrimination).
As I might envy your car for no morally relevant reason, you might also 
envy that I got promoted only because I am the son of the boss. Envy alone 
does not provide sufficient indications about the moral significance of a given 
situation or course of action from an institutional point of view. Envy does not help to sort out situations or actions according to their moral relevance. Rob-
ert Nozick provides an illustration. When elaborating on the ‘strangeness of 
the emotion of envy’, he asks: ‘Why do some people prefer that others not have their better score on some dimension, rather than being pleased at another’s 
being well-off or having good fortune; why don’t they at least just shrug it off?’ 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 240) Describing ‘some people’ as envious suggests that oth-
ers are not. ‘Some people’ suffer from a defective morality while others do not. It suggests that the problem is with the very individuals who resent envy, their moral psychology, preferences or something else, and not with the environ-ment they face. In brief, it points to locating the source of the problem within certain individuals, their psychology or moral motives.
Political consequences are not trivial. Envy as a sign of moral failure fur-nishes reasons for opposing equality and egalitarianism by incriminating the 
envious (Cooper, 1982). Turning envy into a problem of moral character sug-
gests reliance on a “blame the envious, ignore the injustice” kind of rationale. On the one hand, it supports the status quo regarding social hierarchy, inequal-ities or prejudices since the worse-off are always on the envier side as a mat-ter of fact. On the other hand, it adds insult to injury in those cases where envy 
flows from more than a simple, gratuitous and irreprehensible need to have more than others, i.e., when it is created by real prejudices. Far from express-ing a moral defect, envy signals the existence of injustices.David Hume attributes this signalling function to resentment, which is 
a sentiment close to envy. This form of envy is positive since ‘it draws the at-
tention of those in power to those who are excluded’ (La Caze, 2001, p. 39). In 
some situations, ‘undeserved’ advantages are the reasons for feeling envious. 
On other occasions, envy is morally neutral (e.g., envying a lottery winner). So, 
an argument based on envy alone as a justification for or against intervention is probably too thin to neatly demarcate brute envy from legitimate resent-
ment (Ahier & Beck, 2003; Rawls, 1999, pp. 467–468). Separating normatively relevant situations from those that are not requires a close investigation, in each case, of the conditions under which envy took birth (conditions of appro-
priation, rules of exchange, etc.).To conclude, moral judgments that are grounded on an intrinsic rebuttal 
are torn between over-inclusion – all manifestations of envy/positional con-
cerns appeal for regulation – and under-inclusion – manifestations of envy/
quences of specific kinds of social behaviour (those which are supposed to be 
driven by envy/positionality).
A Shortcoming of Moral Character
The first circle of consequences bears on individuals. The argument might be framed as follows: envy is bad because it is bad for those who resent it. How-
ever, one may object that envy is actually beneficial for individuals as a use-ful signal informing them that they fall behind in the competition for essential 
resources (Hill & Buss, 2008). According to this argument, interpersonal com-
parisons (of achievements, income, etc.) are helpful for maximizing one’s sur-
vival and reproductive performance. Envy signals to a given individual that he should invest more effort and resources into competition.39 The valuable effect 
would be to incentivize individuals, enhancing their evolutionary fitness.
Nevertheless, it is possible to acknowledge the role played by envy for evo-lutionary purposes while denying any positive moral content to it. If survival constituted a relevant moral argument, killing competitors or stealing their 
property would be justified. As it is difficult to accept such outcomes, the sur-vival rationale allows serious exceptions. The argument may then be reframed as follows: whatever its evolutionary role, envy is still a bad emotion because 
it corrupts an individual’s character (Van Hooft, 2002, pp. 141–142).40 Positional concerns are the concrete manifestations of a moral character perverted by 
envy, and this mere fact justifies the intervention of institutions.
An immediate reservation arises: envy as a perversion of the moral charac-ter may lead either to curbing positional concerns or to doing absolutely noth-ing. It generates unclear political guidelines. If the problem lies in an emotion 
related to what other people do or are, i.e., if the badness lies first and fore-most in an inner mental state, it could be argued that it is a sad story for the envious, but institutions cannot do much against it. Furthermore, if experi-encing envy is the sign of a crooked moral character, one may then judge that the source of the problem is the envier, not the envied or the situation (e.g., in 
39  For a pop account of this argument, read Buchholz (2011, p. 19).
40 Not developed here is the kind of position adopted by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who 
claim that  ‘every sentiment has some  instances which descry genuine and distinctive  forms of 
value (such as the funny or the shameful). This is true not only of the more attractive cases but 
also of several emotions philosophers often reject as vicious, including disgust, envy, and jeal-
ousy’ (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2006, p. 100). This position, by searching for positive normative fea-
tures within emotions even intuitively detestable, tackles the idea of the inherent badness of 
envy. Consequently, it defends the moral relevance of envy, whereas I make the point that the 
moral relevance of positionality lies somewhere else than in envy.
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that may be envy or something else, which is incarnated into context-sensitive 
behaviours that are (individually and collectively) detrimental.
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
A second set of arguments identifies in positional concerns a threat to individ-
uals’ subjective well-being (SWB thereafter).41 Positionality is bad because it 
propels negative mental states (or lessens positive ones). Striving for relative 
standing or having a lower rank in the distribution of specific materials and symbolic goods hampers one’s happiness. This becomes the main reason for regulating positionality.
Life Satisfaction
A large body of work in economics of happiness mainly supports the claim that 
positional concerns undermine life satisfaction, most notably Richard East-
erlin’s ground-breaking research that finds an absence of marked correlation 
between economic growth and happiness (understood as life satisfaction) in 
many countries (Clark, Frijters, & Shields, 2008; Easterlin, 1973, 1995; Frey & 
Stutzer, 2002). According to Easterlin and others, during the post-war period, self-reported levels of happiness (which is mainly self-reported life satisfac-
tion) stagnated in countries like Japan and the United States. Various authors posit that positional concerns explain this lack of correlation or, even, cause 
the stagnation of happiness (Frank, 1999, pp. 120–121; Layard, 2005; Solnick & 
Hemenway, 1998, p. 375).The connection with relative standing is the following. In countries beyond 
a certain threshold of economic development (around 15,000 US dollars per 
capita in purchasing power parity, in 1995) (Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 10; Ingle-
hart & Klingemann, 2000, p. 168), individuals massively invest their resources in positional goods, i.e., goods demanded for their extrinsic characteristics (i.e., 
capacity to signal one’s status). While during the early stage of economic devel-opment, individual consumption is mostly made of basic commodities (whose contribution to one’s satisfaction depends on absolute level of consumption 
as long as the satiety threshold is not crossed), economic growth fosters posi-tional concerns and the consumption of goods that are demanded for their ex-
trinsic characteristics (Hirsch, 1976).
41  SWB  is a  composite  indicator  that  tracks positive affects, negative affects and  life  satisfaction 
(Landes, 2013; Pavot, 2008).
positional concerns are irrelevant for public purposes. In order to avoid giving too much moral weight to wild expressions of jealousy and envy or, on the con-trary, removing from the radar real prejudices, it may be preferable to shift the framework to normative valuation.
The Social Impact
A third version of the envy argument emphasizes the deleterious effects of envy on social cooperation. The legitimacy of intervention becomes conditional on the actual impact of envy, not on any assumption about its inherent nature. 
As expressed by Marguerite La Caze, this argument ‘does not show that envy 
is harmful in itself ’ but ‘it shows that sometimes envy may lead some people 
to act badly’ (La Caze, 2001, p. 42). In this case, the wrongness lies less in the 
motives than the outcomes, (e.g., reduced willingness to cooperate (Axelrod, 
1984, p. 110), disrespect for laws and regulations, suboptimal social interactions 
(Heath, 2001, p. 11), etc.).
Another, empirical, reason advocates for shifting the scope of the norma-
tive evaluation from the sentiment itself to the effects it generates. While envy is present in many instances where positional concerns are expressed, it is not involved in all of them: there could be positional concerns without envy. For in-stance, the competition among parents to send their children to good schools 
(i.e., ones above the average) is not driven by the envy of what others have but by the desire to maximize the future opportunities of their children.
The conventional wisdom holds that concerns about relative position amount 
to no more than vicious envy and are therefore not to be given any weight 
in public policy decisions. But although positional concerns may often entail 
envy…they could be strong even in envy’s absence. (Frank, 1999, p. 145)Frank underscores two important points. Firstly, people could manifest po-sitional concerns and suffer from positionality even in the absence of envy, which makes the case for regulation. Secondly, the assimilation of positional concerns to envy explains the common-sense judgment that envy, and so posi-
tionality, should not be given any kind of influence on public policy.
Whether envy is involved or not in specific actions or situations has little 
moral significance since it is the consequence of envy that is detrimental, not envy per se. A more solid ground for regulation is constituted by the effects of positionality. This advocates for shifting the focus from envy as a sentiment to the consequences of positional concerns. Instead of grounding the case for reg-ulation on emotions, it promotes paying attention to the effects of something 
69
ARTICLES – Landes • Positional Concerns and Institutions: Some Arguments for Regulation Central European Journal of Public Policy – Vol. 7 – № 2 – June 2013
68
problem lies in the person who suffers from displeasure, loss in SWB or what-
ever (Midlands Psychology Group, 2007). In other words, if you feel unhappy or 
unsatisfied with the achievements of others, it might be because of your mind-set, not because there is something objectionable in other people’s actions or the current state of the world.
(2) Another defect follows from apprehending the badness of positional-
ity through SWB, which, again, mirrors the envy approach (i.e., it only takes an envious individual to generate a moral issue, as it only takes an individual to 
experience a drop in SWB). The focus on mental states renders it difficult to 
discriminate cases where intervention is justified from those where it is not. It is not because institutions have a metric that could represent a valuable di-
mension of human life (SWB) that regulation would be justified. For instance, it is not because racists are displeased by the sight of interracial couples that in-
stitutions must intervene (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 107–108; Young, 1987, p. 262).
An aggravating factor may be the extent to which positional concerns are 
actually hard-wired in the brain. Evolutionary theory offers convincing reasons to believe that human psychology is a favourable environment for the prolif-eration of feelings and emotions that are based on interpersonal comparisons 
(Smith, 2008). So far, it supports arguments against grounding public policies 
on envy, SWB or feelings. Basing regulation on mental states is too expansive 
because it includes all sorts of demands, some conflicting with some commonly shared intuitions about the proper scope of institutions. (Should my neigh-
bour’s opportunity to buy an SUV be suppressed, or should I get compensated on the grounds that it could be a threat to my relative standing and my well-
being?) In other words, it could open a Pandora’s box of mutual recriminations. 
Indeed, the subsequent step taken by authors like Nozick – positionality should 
not be taken into account by institutions – is too extreme. Positionality could matter on moral grounds, but not for the kind of reasons mobilized above.In sum, the case for regulation is weak if limited to mental states. On the one hand, it does not offer clear guidance about where to situate the wrong-ness, which can lead to discarding legitimate concerns, about fairness of various states of the world, for instance. The view that stipulates that the ex-perience of a negative mental state forcibly calls for redress is too broad and 
leads to an inflation of demands. On the other hand, how to avoid this infla-
tionary bias without abandoning relevant claims? As shown above, if over-inclusiveness is a risk, there is also the danger of under-inclusiveness, i.e., discarding legitimate concerns about relative standing. Some guidance could 
be found in considering the social outcomes of positionality, activating the Mil-
lian principle that justifies regulation to compensate or block harms done to 
others (Frank, 2008).
Because the satisfaction that a given individual extracts from status or po-sitional goods depends on the restricted access to scarce goods or positions, such satisfaction is not accessible to everyone. High positions only make sense 
if low positions exist. The point is the same with taste (Bourdieu, 1979). For 
people to be recognized as having refined taste, it is necessary to distinguish oneself from people with bad taste. The rise in satisfaction for those who have access to positional goods or top positions may therefore entail a decrease in 
satisfaction for those who do not have access to such goods or positions. Ul-timately, it might be argued that the positional economy entails a zero-sum game: some participants’ gains being balanced by the losses of others (Hirata, 
2011, p. 45).So, according to this argument, positionality as positional concerns or me-diated through the consumption of positional goods (goods that are demanded for their capacity to signal one’s position/status vis-à-vis scarcity and social 
standards of consumption) undermines the well-being of consumers. They will suffer from psychological harms that they impose on each other. In that re-spect, positional concerns, directly expressed or mediated through positional goods, call for regulation.
The Contention with Subjective Accounts
Indeed, SWB (or happiness or life satisfaction) does not offer strong support for public policy for similar reasons as the ones related to envy.42 For instance, 
suitable life partners are “goods” subject to congestion because they are lim-ited in number. Thus, they have the characteristics of positional goods. Imag-ine now that your wife or your husband makes such a deep impression on me that the comparison with mine makes me feel miserable. Obviously, it impairs my happiness. However, would it give institutions any legitimacy to force you 
to share your wife or your husband with me or to compensate me? As for envy, it might be argued that institutions must interfere not in your life, but in mine, by enrolling me into some psychological support programme, for instance. This illustrates two points.
(1) Invocation of happiness (or another similar mental state and subjective 
evaluation), without any further qualification, could lead to a subtle form of 
moral blaming. Its subjectivist nature exposes the SWB argument to the same critique as envy. In both cases, a collective issue is transformed into a personal 
one. By isolating the problem within the individual, it is suggested that is the 
42  This paper does not  intend to definitively debunk appeals to mental states, but to present  im-
portant objections to such approaches.
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Individual and Collective Costs
The results of the two worlds experiment are relevant for the efficiency argu-
ment. A majority of participants prefer a world where everyone is absolutely 
worse off (while the participants are relatively better off) to another where everyone is absolutely better off (while the participants are relatively worse 
off) in monetary terms. Each member of the hypothetical society could have been better off if they had cared less about their relative standing than about their absolute situation.
Economists usually rely on the Pareto optimum (a state of the world is op-timal if it is impossible to improve the situation of one agent without deteri-
orating the situation of another one) to evaluate the efficiency of different courses of action or states of the world. From this perspective, the two worlds experiment leads to suboptimal outcomes since it is possible to improve the material situation of at least one agent without worsening the situation of an-
other agent. Inefficiency comes into play at two mutually reinforcing levels. It impairs individual conditions while reducing the collective resources available 
for financing public goods.
At the individual level, positionality implies that the outcomes people ex-tract from consumption driven by relative standing depend on the amount of 
resources invested by their ‘competitors’ (Frank, 1999; Hirsch, 1976). Since the dynamics are the same for everyone engaged in positional competition, and everyone’s achievements are negatively correlated with others’ investments and achievements, the incentive is high to try to outbid competitors, which raises the standards for everyone.If people get promoted at work in direct relation to the amount of work ac-complished, and if positions are restricted in number, then the more a given employee works, the more his colleagues interested in the promotion must in-crease their work hours. In the end, everyone raises their workload standards without basically changing the output. If all competitors increase their work by the same amount, it is the same person who will be promoted anyway: the most brilliant one.43
Frank identifies this dynamic in the social standards of consumption and 
the common individual imbalance between positional (work, consumption) 
and non-positional activities (leisure, family, friends, sleep). By spending or 
43 Competition is without a doubt a necessary condition for innovation, gains of productivity, emu-
lation and, in the end, an increase in collective wealth. Nevertheless, the discussion here has less 
to do with competition per se than with some of its pathologies (namely, positional externali-
ties).
(T)he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to oth-
ers. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He can-
not rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him 
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, 
to do so would be wise, or even right (Mill, 1859, p. 22).
Self-inflicted harms or one’s reduced happiness cannot call for regulation, ac-
cording to Mill. Regulation can only be grounded in concrete harms inflicted 
on others. The Millian principle is no magic wand, though. Various poten-
tial harms should be compared and weighed against each other to define the proper scope and entry points for regulation. The forthcoming sections focus 
on this specific question.
Like for envy, SWB does not seem sufficient or even necessary (for in-stance, when people do not fully realize that their condition is undermined 
by positionality) to legitimate regulation. In that respect, two new dimensions emerge. One has to do with the product of social interaction (cooperation, 
competition, etc.), whereas the other has to do with the manner in which this social product is used and distributed. Positional harms involve serious disrup-tions in the creation or distribution of social wealth, implying that there are 
both efficiency and equality dimensions.
EFFICIENCY
Some authors identify the problem as one of efficiency (Frank, 1999; Heath & 
Potter, 2004). From a moral point of view, the fact that people experience envy 
or a decrease in SWB due to positional considerations is secondary in com-parison to the waste of individual and social resources. The point is not that people’s well-being does not matter, but that material conditions have prior-ity over subjective accounts. If institutions should be concerned with position-
ality, first as a process (positional concerns themselves) and then as a result 
(the distribution of positions), it is because of its impact on the creation and 
repartition of resources, because ‘we seem not to be spending our money in 
the ways that would most promote our own interests’ (Frank, 1999, p. 95). This issue underlies this whole section: positionality represents a threat to collective 
and individual interests, which justifies regulation.
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To pay for larger and more elaborate consumption goods, we must devote 
fewer resources to other things…Paying for luxury consumption has also 
meant having to curtail spending in the public sphere. Apart from high rates 
of increase in public spending on medical care and income transfers for the 
elderly, the past two decades have been a time for across-the-board retrench-
ment in public goods and services of all sorts (Frank, 1999, p. 53).
If positional competition is detrimental, why don’t individuals drop out? Why 
is regulation necessary? One might acknowledge such effects and, at the same time, deny institutions the legitimacy to curb positional concerns and compe-tition. Despite the deriving costs, it might be argued that individual decisions to engage and stay in positional competition are genuine because the individ-uals get psychological and material rewards out of them. This is mostly an em-pirical question, falling partly outside the scope of normative evaluation. But, it should be recognized that the current evidence on the deleterious effects of positional concerns and competition on individual well-being supports an at best neutral, but more likely negative, vision of positionality.
More importantly from a moral perspective, the property rights that are enshrined in all the constitutive texts of liberal democracies guarantee to all 
citizens the right to destroy (or waste) their own property (in Roman law, jus 
abutendi).46 It might be claimed that such a right has precedence over any reg-ulatory consideration (especially if it could be demonstrated that the concept 
of ‘waste’ is loosely defined in the case of positional externalities). If people de-cide to waste the resources that they have legitimately acquired on positional races, nothing should prohibit them from doing so.
This raises two sets of issues: (a) one about the consequences and (b) an-other about the conditions for exercising the right to destroy one’s property.
Regarding (a), when determining the strength of rights, the manner in which individuals use them has normative implications. For instance, one can-not use or waste one’s property in a way that is harmful to others (e.g., by 
burning toxic chemical waste in one’s courtyard). The use of objects deter-
mines the moral and legal force of this specific right. Hence, the core of the is-sue is to determine how harmful positionality is.
Concerning (b), it is commonly accepted that to be entitled to exercise a given right, the bearer should be in an adequate position to do so, which means that she should be autonomous (i.e., have the necessary cognitive abil-
ities to consent), have access to the relevant information to give what medical 
46  For a debate about the content and extent of such a right, see Edward McCaffery (2001) and Lior 
Strahilevitz (2005).
working too much, individuals produce negative positional externalities (neg-ative externalities are costs imposed on agents who were not part of the initial 
market transactions and, so, have not benefited from a given transaction but 
still carry part of the cost, e.g., pollution).
According to Frank, the positional problem is first and foremost a con-sumption problem, where the scale of consumption, as well as the kind of 
goods consumed (positional), creates positional externalities. ‘A positional ex-ternality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which 
an existing positional good is evaluated’ (Frank, 2008, p. 1777). The context of choice is altered by the rise of spending standards (for gifts, clothing, elec-tronic home equipment, appropriate summerhouse, fancy vacation destination, 
etc.).The dynamics are global. Due to a process of imitation, socioeconomic cat-egories tend to replicate the spending patterns of the income category just 
above them, nurturing ‘expenditure cascades’ (Frank, 2007, pp. 49–65).44 The externalities, which have to do with the competitive and spending environ-
ment (the context of choice), impact individuals in an inescapable way because 
‘an increase in someone’s relative status automatically translates to a decrease 
in the relative status of (at least some) others in the relevant reference group’ 
(Heffetz & Frank, 2008, p. 6).
This ‘positional treadmill’ – the ‘process by which each person strives to gain advantage, but since all are trying to go ahead, all remain in the same rel-
ative position’ (Solnick & Hemenway, 1998, p. 375) – entails significant costs for individuals. Time, effort and money are invested in positional races while they could have been used to pursue more individual and collective ends. For instance, low socioeconomic status groups, even in developing countries (Van 
Kempen, 2009), devote too many resources to conspicuous consumption at the expense of education, health or food.45 This pattern is noxious. It undermines people’s current and future prospects because they have fewer resources for pursuing non-positional but vital ends.Positional concerns have also collective consequences. Individuals resent their contribution to public infrastructures (roads, bridges, railroads, hospitals, 
schools, etc.) as handicapping them in the current positional competition.
44  For a description of this phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s, the reader may refer to 
Juliet Schor’s The Overspent American (Schor, 1998).
45  An explanation is that low-status (income) individuals operate a trade-off between the utility of 
the goods consumed and their capacity to improve one’s status. While high-status people would 
tend to favour the quality (utility) of the objects they consume, low-status people would prior-
itize their signalling features (Rucker & Galinsky, 2009).
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with other parents.48 The same goes if one wants to secure her material con-ditions and have a decent academic career. She should publish more than her 
colleagues (Landes, Marchman, & Nielsen, 2013). In both cases, it explains why people have good reasons to be concerned by positionality: one’s position mat-ters for a broad array of life outcomes (e.g., having a stimulating job, mating, 
giving the best opportunities to one’s children, and so forth).Thus, raising people’s awareness is not likely to lessen positional competi-tion because positional concerns stem from the context of choice. It is the rea-
son why approaches that advocate for ‘voluntary simplicity’, advancing the idea that individuals should lower their expectations for limiting positional compe-
tition, do not offer workable solutions (Heath & Potter, 2004, p. 256). The ‘vol-untary simplicity’ view is endorsed by Schneider when he agrees with Stoicism 
that status inferiority should not be ‘feared’ or ‘despised’ (Schneider, 2007, 
p. 78), or De Botton when he considers that ‘we should surrender our puer-ile concern for policing our own status…in order to settle instead for the more 
solidly grounded satisfactions of a logically based sense of our worth’ (Botton, 
2004, p. 129).The view I defend here is that unless the rules of the game (i.e., the context 
of choice) are changed (e.g., consumption taxed at an incremental rate, less ex-
posure to publicity, regulation on extra hours worked, etc.), no significant im-
provement is to be expected. The efficiency argument suggests that, since it is not only a story of pure status-seeking for the sake of it, voluntary simplicity offers little grip on the situation. Positional harms are not limited to a deprived sense of self-worth. They imply restricted life options or undermined mate-rial conditions, i.e., real costs. Shielding oneself against positionality is more complex than not paying attention to status, not caring about others’ opinions 
or pursuing more self-centred and fulfilling goals. Positionality induces real harms that should be the focus of institutions precisely because the avoidance of such harms is one of the main factors determining the strategy adopted by players in positional games.
In sum, the efficiency argument shows that (1) positional concerns are to 
some extent counterproductive at both individual and collective levels, and (2) individuals are trapped into positional competition. It emphasizes the salience of the context of choice and its impact on material conditions. Implicitly, the ef-
ficiency argument underscores the dual dimensions of positionality: as a dy-namic fuelled by the context of choice, but also as the context of choice itself, i.e., the segmentation of the social space in classes and groups. In any case, this 
48 Parents’ positional concerns for their children have been documented in several studies, espe-
cially cross-cultural ones (Solnick et al., 2007).
ethics qualifies as ‘informed consent’ and not be subject to pressure or manip-ulation. From this perspective, the fact that positionality implies a collective ac-
tion problem under the form of a prisoner dilemma challenges the conditions of the exercise of the jus abutendi.The problem with positionality is that it frames a context of choice that traps individuals into unhealthy consumption patterns. Comparison may be 
drawn with an arms race (Frank, 1999, pp. 150–158). As in an arms race where rivals cannot drop out of the competition if they want to keep a fair ability to 
dissuade aggression (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1993, p. 13), positional competition is 
necessary for securing social recognition (Veblen, 1994, pp. 19–20) and other 
advantages (e.g., high-quality education, networking, etc.).47 People cannot avoid positionality and are unable to enforce local and freely negotiated solu-
tions because their incentive to defect is too strong (Elster, 1985, p. 139).
In conclusion, intervention is legitimate because of (1) individual patterns 
of overspending, (2) the impact of externalities created by these patterns on 
an individual’s ability to lead a satisfying life, (3) the collective misallocation 
of resources (people tend to contribute too little to public goods), and (4) the impossibility of enforcing private solutions due to prisoner’s-dilemma-like po-
sitional competition. Notwithstanding the costs and externalities dimension, 
the efficiency argument has an additional advantage. Instead of situating the 
core of the issue in envy, defect of the moral character or SWB, it identifies the problem as one of collective action: the wrongness of positionality has more to do with the context of the decision it frames than, for instance, human psychol-ogy. Due to the force of incentives, the context of choice often overrides even the best intentions and thus raises the issue of regulation.
The Context of Choice
Positional competition looks like prisoners’ dilemma, i.e., ‘situation in which 
there are gains from cooperation…but each player has an incentive to “free 
ride”…whatever the other player does’ (Osborne, 2003, p. 13). Being less con-cerned with status does not help when searching for a place for one’s chil-dren in a top school or trying to get a permanent position at a university. If one wants to give the best chances of success to her offspring, she has to compete 
47 One example is the competition to live in a neighbourhood with good schools. In a lot of coun-
tries, the place where parents live determines to which school they can send their children (ei-
ther because it is a requirement under a public schooling system (school zoning) or for com-
muting reasons). The consequence is an overbidding process among parents to rent or buy a 
home around such schools, which translates into a premium. For instance, it was evaluated at 
approximately 5% of the value of real estate in Paris (Fack & Grenet, 2009).
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that respect, health inequalities can result from three sources, among others: 
(a) asymmetries of power, (b) lack of autonomy and (c) discrimination.49 The point is not to deliver a causal analysis of status, but to underscore latent fac-
tors, which have been at the heart of reflections in political theory.
(a) Employees could suffer from abusive superiors. The stress originates from interacting with people who have the power to arbitrarily interfere in other people’s lives. 50 The solution is to impose strict control on the exercise 
of managerial prerogatives. (b) People can also suffer from a lack of auton-
omy, which usually translates into acute feelings of helplessness (Martinko & 
Gardner, 1982; Seligman, 1975). To remedy that, employees’ control over their 
work environment and the attribution of tasks ought to be improved. (c) Peo-ple could be subject to discriminatory judgments or practices that may damage 
their self-esteem and self-confidence and reduce their opportunities. The prob-
lem is then one of a frail sense of self-respect (Rawls, 1999, p. 386).In the end, disparities in health could spring from unequal standing in work conditions and a lack of autonomy. The difference with the thesis stipu-lating that status creates health inequalities is that it requires a step backward in order to isolate the underlying factors of health inequalities, and this back-ward evaluative movement has institutional implications.Instead of correcting status by, for instance, levelling all hierarchies or 
structures of distinction (the feasibility of which could be questioned), insti-tutions may focus on some root parameters (protection against hierarchical 
abuse, preservation of employee voice, work autonomy, antidiscrimination). In that sense, status becomes an indicator of potential exposure to deeper injus-
tices or vulnerabilities. Whether it is status per se, the quest for status nour-ished by concerns for relative standing that create these inequalities or some underlying factors mirrored by status, the argument remains the same. In-dividuals have good reasons for being concerned with their status, and in-
stitutions should pay attention to relative standing and its effects. Because positionality as social standing deeply impacts one’s life (morbidity and life ex-
pectancy), people51 will not reduce their positional concerns without external 
49 The importance of autonomy for individual psychological well-being has been underlined by 
psychological research, most notably by Self-Determination Theory (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008).
50 On institutional mechanisms for preserving citizens’ freedom against domination, the reader 
may refer, for instance, to neo-republican literature (Pettit, 1999).
51  It is not even certain that the difference of perspectives leads to radically divergent political pre-
scriptions. At first sight,  if  institutions pay attention to status alone,  they could be tempted to 
level  the playing field. However,  it  is  difficult  to  consider  that  focusing on  status  asymmetries 
could be a  self-sufficient proposition, as good/secured/high status  implies security from abuse, 
autonomy and protection against discrimination. 
section suggested that positional concerns conflict with people’s basic inter-ests, i.e., their capacity to pursue their conception of the good without harming 
others, which calls for regulation. But to forge a stronger case, it is necessary to look into a last set of arguments.
EQUALITY AND JUSTICE
The fourth set of justifications is intertwined with efficiency: concerns for rel-ative standing do not only yield suboptimal outcomes, but they also threaten people’s material conditions, their capacity to realize their conception of the 
good and their health. They endanger individuals’ fundamental interests. As such, positionality highlights egalitarian considerations in two complementary 
ways: through the ‘status syndrome’ (Marmot, 2004) and by affecting individ-uals’ material conditions. The first is related to the outcome of positional con-cerns, namely, relative standing, whereas the second focuses on the dynamics that lead to such an outcome, so positional concerns proper.
Status Syndrome
The first factor does not relate to the dynamics initiated by positional concerns 
(status-seeking), but to their results (the distribution of positions or status re-
sulting from a competitive process). It provides some clues as to why people may have sound reasons to worry about their relative standing and act to im-prove it and, in the end, why institutions should also be concerned by posi-tional concerns and their outcomes.
Basically, the research on the social determinants of health (CSDH, 2008; 
Marmot, 2004; Wilkinson, 2000; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010) shows that the lower the status of a person, the more likely she is to face stress-related pa-thologies, such as ischemic diseases or psychopathological disorders. In short, 
‘there is a social gradient in health in individuals who are not poor: the higher 
the social position, the better the health’ (Marmot, 2006, p. 1304). In itself, rel-ative standing is a powerful factor of health inequalities, impacting individuals’ health and life expectancy. This importance is precisely what could explain the strength of individual positional concerns.Two questions emerge, which, despite an empirical blend, convey a norma-tive dimension. First, do individuals suffer from their relative standing proper or 
from some underlying factors (that could be indirectly related to status)?
Take workplace relations. A sizable portion of individual contentment and 
social recognition in industrialized societies flows from one’s occupation. In 
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considerations based on equality and justice could support the idea that the in-
crease in spending driven by positional concerns calls for regulation. The first 
relates to the value of equality for current decision makers (i.e., adults). The second concerns trans-generational justice. The third relies on the instrumen-
tal value of equality (for efficiency purposes).
The first argument relies on the value of equality per se. The ideal of equal-ity is so central in industrialised societies that it obliges institutions to inter-vene to suppress most inequalities and injustices and also to intervene in the positional dynamics that create some of these inequalities. It is a question of respect for citizens since institutions should not let individuals undermine their material conditions. Regulation would be obligatory due to the cogni-tive defects from which individuals suffer and that jeopardize their ability to identify the constituents and means of their well-being. Recent research in experimental psychology and economics on cognitive biases, heuristics and 
miswanting offers empirical support to such a claim (Ariely, 2008; Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2000; Stanovich, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).One may nevertheless object that this argument grounds regulation on the unacceptable premise that individuals do not perceive their own good (or, at 
least, that institutions are in a better position to do so). This assumption would be unacceptable because it would violate a fundamental principle of liberal de-mocracies, namely, respect for people and their capacity to endorse a concep-
tion of the good that they make their own (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 216–217).The objection nevertheless misses the point: individuals do not suffer from positionality because they are not aware of it but because they cannot escape from it. The argument of the intrinsic value of equality does not require posit-ing that individuals are not capable of discerning their good, only that they are handicapped in pursuing it. Individuals know they work, spend, and care about their relative standing too much, but they also know that appearances, external signs of success and status matter for various purposes (dating, getting a job or 
a promotion, networking, and so forth). They are sensitive to what Frank calls 
the ‘rising cost of adequate’ (Frank, 2007, p. 49). More generally, they are con-scious of the importance of relative standing (not simply because they would 
be envious or jealous) and the high cost of non-compliance given the way that 
social interactions are structured. Even if they were not, they usually act as if they were. The fact that positional competition has the form of a collective ac-tion problem advocates for regulation, i.e., altering the context of choice (e.g., 
taxation or regulation).
The second category of justifications has less to do with current genera-
tions (in fact, current decision makers) than the next ones. If positionality may severely impair the material conditions of existing individuals, it also has an 
support.The second question is the following: do individuals with higher status end 
up with better health, or is it the other way around?
Without claiming any expertise, the most sensible option is to assume that causation works both ways and, possibly, in a mutually reinforcing manner. People with better health perform better (because they are less absent from 
work, more productive, more resilient in front of stress, etc.) and finish with 
higher status than people who are less lucky in health matters. But high-sta-
tus people (and their children) also end up with better health (due to higher income, better information, more control over their work, higher quality food, 
goods and environment, etc.). However, if health is partly the result of genetic 
determinants, the rest of it flows from living conditions. The same goes for people of high status since they have a secured access to a set of goods that enhance their health prospects. In both cases, it highlights some underlying factors, i.e., individuals’ material conditions, and adds weight to the view that people have good reasons to care about their relative standing, and so, have lit-tle incentive to step out of positional competition.
Underlying Material ConditionsThe literature, especially on the social determinants of health, is quite clear on 
the detrimental effects of positionality as social standing. But this is not unre-lated to the dynamics that lead to a given distribution of ranks and positions. Positional harms may be created by the result but also by the process that has led to such a result. In that sense, positional competition is damaging because it erodes individuals’ access to important resources and ability to turn them into concrete achievements by nurturing patterns of overconsumption and un-dersaving.Trapped in positional arms races, individuals raise their expenditures to keep up with their competitors and social standards in the pursuit of social distinction. This pressure has contributed to the recent growth in material in-
equalities, as well as the other way around (Frank, 2007, p. 6; Wisman, 2009). Overall, people have fewer resources for positional competition and, more im-
portantly, for non-positional purposes. Along with cutting down on expenses like food or health, their other option is to increasingly rely on credit, which 
produces further (self) harms (reduced future resources, an unbalanced finan-
cial situation, personal debts or bankruptcy, etc.).
This is ultimately an argument about the loss of efficiency suffered by in-
dividuals when they try to maximize their welfare. But it is also an argument about inequality, which incidentally reinforces the previous point. Three sets of 
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ardizes social cooperation. To be perfectly clear, situating the badness of posi-tionality in an emotional or a mental state does not confront on moral grounds the evidence that people’s absolute situation is undermined by their inability to easily escape positional concerns.There is a notable difference, however, between legitimating regulation and advocating for any particular policy. Since this article concentrates on mapping out various arguments in favour of curbing positionality, the ques-tion of the best means for this purpose has been left untouched (taxation on 
income, consumption, publicity, extra hours worked, credit control, etc.). The case has been made that, when evaluating such propositions, attention should be paid to the very reason why institutions should care about positionality in 
first place: its social outcomes, especially its impact on an individual’s ability to lead a satisfying life.Once this conclusion is advanced, though, there is a broad range of institu-
tional interventions one may consider appropriate (Grolleau, Galochkin, & Su-
tan, 2012). The question is, of course, pragmatic in the sense that it isolates the 
most efficient instruments for controlling most of the negative effects of posi-
tional concerns. But, the work left is also normative in the sense that it is nec-essary to determine the most legitimate tools, from a moral perspective, to be used for such a purpose. To be sure, this combination of pragmatic and norma-
tive reflections is one of the most fascinating and underexplored areas calling for interdisciplinary discussions among specialists of economics, political the-ory and public policy.
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